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Highlights
 – Several regulatory regimes have been conceived to incentivize network operators 
to provide services in an efficient manner and to pull them in a continuous pro-
cess of revelation of the economics of their tasks’ operation. 
 – Major challenges are arising today for the electricity system (such as: network 
quality concerns, various grid innovations, or climate change policy). The classi-
cal “cost killing” goals of incentive regulation are then challenged with new goals. 
The regulators must find how to optimally match their existing regulatory tools 
with these renewed goals while taking into account more of the actual specifici-
ties of the network operation.
 – The economic literature built the existing regulatory tools we have today by as-
suming that a regulator behaves like a theoretical actor, having all the ideally 
desired cognitive and computational capabilities. The reality, however, is that the 
regulators are endowed with only limited and heterogeneous resources.
 – Theory frequently assumed that a regulator uses a single type of regulatory tool 
to give incentives to a network company performing a single type of tasks. In real 
life, the regulators are facing companies performing multiple types of tasks and 
have to use several types of regulatory tools to deal with these different tasks.
 – Regulatory tools should then be assessed to properly match with the real charac-
teristics of the network operator’s tasks. We assume that the key characteristics 
for an operationalization of this “regulatory alignment” are: the controllability, 
predictability and observability of the tasks, the costs and the output. However 
these regulatory characteristics have to be aligned as well with the requirements 
of the various regulatory tools in terms of regulator’s resources and capabilities. 
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Background
Electricity network regulation has been conceived to ensure 
that network services are produced at minimum costs for a giv-
en quality of service. Due to asymmetrical information between 
the regulator and the network operator, several regulatory re-
gimes have been conceived to incentivize companies to provide 
their services in an efficient manner and to push / pull them in a 
process of revealing their private information on the economics 
of their tasks operation (Box 1).
Major changes have recently occurred with electricity systems: 
new network quality concerns have appeared, climate change 
policy is now a key driver of the EU energy policy and grid 
growing innovation is becoming a concern. Regulation should 
then reconsider what are the right incentives to undertake all 
this. The classical cost-killing goal of “RPI-x” has to adapt to 
new goals of regulation. The regulators have to find how to opti-
mally match all workable regulatory tools with today’s relevant 
goals as well as with the actual economic characteristics of net-
work operators’ tasks. 
The economic literature built most of the existing regulatory 
tools by assuming that the regulator is an agent having all the 
desired cognitive and computational abilities to properly deal 
with information asymmetry. The reality, however, is that reg-
ulators are endowed with only limited and heterogeneous re-
sources. Furthermore the regulator is supposed to control the 
network operators’ costs as a whole while they actually are the 
byproducts of different tasks with different economic charac-
teristics. Today, the right regulatory question should then be: 
how to align the regulatory tools, the regulator capabilities and 
the targeted network tasks to deliver a set of efficient outcomes? 
Discrepancy between the practice of 
regulation and the textbook model of a 
regulator
In the textbook model, the regulator is assumed to have suf-
ficient cognitive, computational and administrative abilities 
to implement a regulatory regime decreasing the information 
asymmetry and dealing efficiently with the risk and uncertainty 
in the regulatory environment. However in reality, most regula-
tors have severely limited resources (power, budget and skills) 
to efficiently implement all the conceivable regulatory tools. 
Regulators’ actual capabilities depend primarily on their cur-
rent resources and accumulated experiences which may strong-
ly deviate from what the textbook model assumes. Furthermore 
regulators behave according to countries’ political and judicial 
profiles which influence their willingness to undertake risky 
decisions. Regulators may have to be conservative to avoid 
negative judicial reviews (like in the USA). They may also be 
small administrative units of 10-20 people unable to enter into 
uncertain and complex regulatory innovation. On the contrary, 
the UK’s regulator has been an atypical case of a rather rich, 
free and sometimes risk taking regulator able to invest in in-
novative regulatory regimes, to adapt to the changing energy 
scene, and to look after dynamic efficiency going beyond the 
already acclaimed cost killing objectives. A regulator with re-
sources and power may undertake uncertain changes and face 
a risk of error. 
Besides this, textbook regulation generally assumed that the 
regulator addresses a company performing a unique task with a 
single regulatory tool. In practice however, the regulator is fac-
ing a company performing various types of tasks and may have 
to apply various regulatory tools to these different tasks. Any 
applied economic reasoning should now reevaluate the regula-
tory tools in a renewed rational choice frame.  
Box 1: Theoretical regulatory tools
Cost plus: The simpler regulation of electricity networks has had to focus on controlling the costs of services provided by the regulated firms. 
This was based on the principle of compensating the regulated firms up to their costs. In this regulatory frame the regulator observes and audits, 
each year generally, the firms’ operating and investment costs and sets the allowed revenue for that (or the next) year. This revenue includes a 
reward in the form of a rate-of-return compensating the firms’ capital assets. In very general terms, with this regime, the regulated firms keep 
the benefit from their informational advantage. Rather, they are not incited to reveal more than their observable costs from their own set of 
economic information.
Price/Revenue Cap: Contrarily to cost plus regulation, price cap regulation implies that the regulator unilaterally sets a maximum allowed rev-
enue (or a price per unit of output) that the firm can get for the services provided in a conventional period –four to five years- so as to be partially 
but not totally linked to its incurred costs. As the length of the regulatory period is relatively longer than with cost plus regulation, the incurred 
costs could happen to be lower than the earned revenue. This allows the firm to benefit from its cost cutting. This regulatory scheme provides 
simple and clear incentives for cost reduction which would increase the social welfare (with less costs for the same output) in an environment 
based on asymmetric information. This does not mean that the asymmetrical information problem is easily solved. Notably in cases where there 
is a too important lack of regulator expertise to properly anticipate and predict the future firm’s costs, firms might earn excessive rents within that 
regulatory period. However, only very dramatic regulator mistakes could end reducing the social welfare.
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Characteristics of the network operator’s 
tasks 
Beside the discrepancy between the reality of regulators’ abili-
ties and the assumption of the textbook model, it is also usually 
assumed that the regulator frames a company performing a sin-
gle task with a single regulatory tool. In practice, network op-
erators perform various types of tasks with different character-
istics. For transmission, the main tasks may be seen as various 
as: 1- system operation, 2- grid maintenance, 3- network user 
connection, 4- customer relationship management and 5- grid 
expansion. TSOs may also face new tasks arising from the new 
regulatory objectives, like a revival of RD&D in both domains 
of infrastructure and services. 
Controlling the network operator’s costs and service quality as a 
whole would then be inefficient given the heterogeneous nature 
of its tasks. Encouraging companies to reduce operational ex-
penditures could lead to a lower quality of this or that provided 
service. Another drawback arises with innovation which is in-
evitably costly in the short term with an expected benefit only 
obtained in a longer period while exposing the company to a 
higher risk. That is why, first, the regulator should strike a prop-
er balance between medium term novelties and short term cost 
efficiency by assessing the firm’s financial sustainability in the 
long run. Second, the regulator may have to conceive a hybrid 
approach that combines various kinds of regulatory tools to bet-
ter address the various characteristics of the different tasks. 
The key regulatory characteristics of the various network tasks 
belong to three categories: Controllability, Predictability (ex 
ante) and Observability (ex post) (Box 2).  
Menu of Contracts: Cost plus and price cap regulations are, in theory, the two extreme cases in terms of gain and risk sharing. The menu of 
contract scheme lies in between these two extremes. The price that the regulated firm will receive is linked ex ante to its realized costs observed 
ex post as well as to a reference cost determined ex ante. The regulator then offers a set of benefits / costs sharing contracts and the firm chooses 
the more suitable one regarding its privately projected expenditures, its efficiency capability belief and its own risk aversion. Such contract 
mechanism would open higher productive and allocative efficiency objectives. On the one hand it is conceived to provide incentives to perform 
much better by giving the firm the opportunity to benefit from its own knowledge of feasible cost saving and better serving. On the other hand, 
it ensures that prices have to follow an underlying cost variation within a reasonable distance. 
Performance-based Regulation: Menu of contracts is a general category which covers PBR (Performance Based Regulation). PBR has been 
used to better target a particular task with its own particular incentive schemes (like: cost of losses; cost of reserves; cost of congestions; etc.). It 
gives a direct link between the ex post observed performance and an ex ante defined set of financial reward and penalty. Ex ante the regulator 
has set a specific formula that links a financial reward-penalty scheme to a firm’s expected tasks expressed in an agreed KPI (“Key Performance 
Indicator”). 
Yardstick (Benchmarking): It is a way to set performances or prices of a given company on the basis of the outcomes of other similar companies. 
In its full form, each benchmarked company has no control over its own revenues. Its allowed revenues are only linked to an index of the other 
suppliers’ performances. A second and relaxed approach relies on external performances for only one part of the firm’s revenues. It usually covers 
the calculation of a productivity trend factor or an initial price in a price cap scheme. It may also be the ex ante targeting of a task performance 
in the performance-based regulation.
Box 2: Regulatory characteristics of network operator’s tasks
Controllability: It qualifies the network operator’s ability to manage a single cost/task or a combination of several as to get a defined level and 
quality of output. 
Predictability: It qualifies the possibility of predicting (then: ex ante) the influence of external factors on network costs/tasks and the relationship 
between a given set of costs/tasks and the level and quality of outputs.
Observability: It qualifies the possibility of verifying (then: ex post) the influence of external factors on network costs/tasks and the relationship 
between a given set of costs/tasks and the level and quality of outputs.
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The regulatory alignment between network 
tasks, regulatory tools and regulator’s 
abilities
The first criterion to look at when wanting to match a network 
task and a regulatory tool is the controllability of the task by 
the network operator. When the network operator is unable 
to significantly influence the cost or the outcome of a task, the 
economics of the output are mainly out of the company’s con-
trol. It will not make much sense to regulate such a task with an 
incentive scheme. This will be better addressed via a cost plus 
scheme. To get the maximum benefits of that scheme the regu-
lator should then have minimum accounting capabilities as to 
audit the company’s uncontrollable costs and to set a tariff for 
them (for instance, in a meshed grid used for high transit from 
abroad the operator cannot easily control its aggregated volume 
of losses).
When network tasks are controllable, the TSO can undertake 
actions to reach an efficient level of operation, and an incentive 
regulatory scheme makes sense (for instance, congestion costs 
being controllable in the medium term -while not easily in the 
short term- and volume of losses in an isolated power system 
where the TSO is actually able to act on these levels). 
In practice, however, the choice of the appropriate regulatory 
tool will then depend on the (ex ante) predictability of the task 
operation, and the regulator’s own capability to manage more 
complex and more hazardous decision processes to influence 
the targeted efficient outcome. 
However, when the task’s outcomes are too difficult to predict 
(by the company or by the regulator), a cost plus scheme could 
always be applied as a “safe plan B”. It can also be the case with 
unfamiliar innovation undertaking. 
Inversely, a regulator might conceive more complex incentive 
schemes whose risks depend on the degree of task predictabili-
ty, given that a low predictability should imply a higher risk and 
vice versa. The degree of task predictability is also linked to the 
regulator’s proper capabilities. A regulator with a large senior 
and experienced team plus a large consultancy budget can bet-
ter tackle the hazards of complex schemes than a regulator with 
a limited junior staff and a starvation budget. 
Finally, the last step in a regulatory tool choice comes with the 
task / cost’s (ex post) observability. Observability may be too low 
or the regulator may think that its very limited resources will 
not allow it to collect relevant enough information on the actual 
management of the tasks having been performed. Here again 
the regulator may prefer the safeguard of a cost plus scheme.  
On the contrary, in case of a limited observability of certain 
tasks for a rich and experienced regulator, it makes sense for 
it to invest in more advanced regulatory tools as a “menu of 
contracts” where the company is pulled into a voluntary effi-
ciency revelation scheme. When the menu of contracts is con-
ceived correctly enough, the company will rationaly choose a 
contract that fits best with its true (while unobservable) task 
characteristics. Another sophisticated way to address this in-
formation problem is to apply benchmarking techniques, cre-
ating a “virtual competition environment” upon the condition 
that the regulator could get enough relevant information from 
several comparable network operators. It also assumes that the 
regulator has enough cognitive and computational capabilities 
as to manage the demanding process of benchmarking results 
interpretation.
Of course with a high observability of tasks, a regulator may 
choose less sophisticated tools requiring lower experience and 
resources. We must however distinguish two types of observ-
able tasks. When the observable task is an input into the firm’s 
activity process and is required to provide a well-defined out-
put, a price cap regulation might be appropriate. Under this re-
gime, the network operator could undertake efficient actions to 
reduce the cost / increase the output of the task and to benefit 
from this improvment (for instance, transmission maintenance 
tasks are controllable, predictable and observable. Assuming 
that the regulator could easily observe the past firm’s perfor-
mances, a price cap regulation with a defined efficiency target 
should be sufficient). 
However the output may have two separated dimensions: the 
quantity (the volume) and the quality (the unitary utility for 
the consumer) of the provided service. When both are observ-
able and the regulator is also able to properly define (ex ante) 
and measure (ex post) the quality of service, a “performance-
based” regulation of the output would be more appropriate than 
a price cap. When quality is controllable in the medium term it 
is because the network operator knows how to influence it by 
her investment and maintenance decisions. Quality may also 
be predictable if extreme events are filtered out from the qual-
ity indicators. Quality may then be observable to some extents, 
depending on the set of indicators that the regulator is able 
to conceive and to use. With an output regulation for quality, 
the regulator sets the output targets that the network operator 
should meet within a predefined period as well as certain eco-
nomic schemes reacting to the observed deviations. Any gap 
vis-a-vis the ex ante target will be treated in a predefined pen-
alty or a reward function.   
We now look at tasks closely linked to an innovation process. 
An innovation process may be controllable in the sense that 
the network operator may significantly influence the output 
of innovation that it will produce. However innovation has a 
low degree of predictability and observability. Nevertheless this 
predictability and observability also increases with the techno-
logical and managerial maturity of the innovation process. In 
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case of low maturity, it seems inappropriate to put in place an 
incentive regulation tool because of the difficulty for both the 
regulator and the network operator to predict innovation’s costs 
and benefits, whatever the actual degree of regulator abilities. In 
case of higher maturity, however, an incentive regulation that 
sets a rule of risk sharing between the network operator and 
the grid users may usefully be considered. A scheme is to pay 
innovation by unit of outcome measured by some KPI. Again, 
the degree of observability of the innovation process depends 
significantly on the innovation maturity. 
Figure 1 summarizes the “regulatory alignment” decision tree 
to identify the appropriate regulatory tool assuming certain 
regulator’s capabilities, the network operator’s nature of tasks 
and the implementable regulatory tools. To sum up: If a par-
ticular task does not satisfy any of the controllability, predict-
ability and observability criteria, then the cost plus scheme is 
the most likely tool to recover the incurred cost. Otherwise, 
the usefulness of any other appropriate regulatory tool would 
mainly depend on the actual regulator endowment.    
Cost +
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Output 
regulation
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Figure 1: A Regulatory Alignment Decision Tree
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